Cheap threats : why the United States struggles to coerce weak states /
Pfundstein Chamberlain, Dianne,
Cheap threats : why the United States struggles to coerce weak states / Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain. - xii, 270 pages ; 24 cm
Includes bibliographical references (pages 241-260) and index.
Introduction : too cheap to compel -- The logic of costly compellence -- U.S. compellent threats 1945-2007 -- The 1962 Cuban missile crisis -- The 2011 Libya crisis -- The 1991 threat against Iraq -- The 2003 threat against Iraq -- Conclusion : the implications of costly compellence for theory and policy -- Appendix. Description of how the dataset was constructed.
The United States has a huge advantage in military power over other states, yet it is frequently unable to coerce weak adversary states with threats alone. Instead, over the past two decades, the leaders of Iraq, Haiti, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya have dismissed US threats and invited military clashes. Why have weak states risked and ultimately suffered catastrophic defeat when giving in to US demands earlier might have allowed their survival? Why was it necessary to use force at all? Pfundstein finds that the United States' compellent threats often fail because the use of force has become relatively cheap for the United States in terms of political costs, material costs, and casualties. This comparatively low-cost model of war that relies on deficit spending, air power, high technology, and a light footprint by an all-volunteer force has allowed the United States to casually threaten force and frequently carry out short-term military campaigns. Paradoxically, this frequent use of "cheap" force has made adversary states doubt that the United States is highly motivated to bear high costs over a sustained period if the intervention is not immediately successful.
9781626162822 1626162824 9781626162815 1626162816
2015025240
Military art and science--Decision making.
Strategy.
United States--Military policy.
United States--Military relations--Developing countries.
Developing countries--Military relations--United States.
Cheap threats : why the United States struggles to coerce weak states / Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain. - xii, 270 pages ; 24 cm
Includes bibliographical references (pages 241-260) and index.
Introduction : too cheap to compel -- The logic of costly compellence -- U.S. compellent threats 1945-2007 -- The 1962 Cuban missile crisis -- The 2011 Libya crisis -- The 1991 threat against Iraq -- The 2003 threat against Iraq -- Conclusion : the implications of costly compellence for theory and policy -- Appendix. Description of how the dataset was constructed.
The United States has a huge advantage in military power over other states, yet it is frequently unable to coerce weak adversary states with threats alone. Instead, over the past two decades, the leaders of Iraq, Haiti, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya have dismissed US threats and invited military clashes. Why have weak states risked and ultimately suffered catastrophic defeat when giving in to US demands earlier might have allowed their survival? Why was it necessary to use force at all? Pfundstein finds that the United States' compellent threats often fail because the use of force has become relatively cheap for the United States in terms of political costs, material costs, and casualties. This comparatively low-cost model of war that relies on deficit spending, air power, high technology, and a light footprint by an all-volunteer force has allowed the United States to casually threaten force and frequently carry out short-term military campaigns. Paradoxically, this frequent use of "cheap" force has made adversary states doubt that the United States is highly motivated to bear high costs over a sustained period if the intervention is not immediately successful.
9781626162822 1626162824 9781626162815 1626162816
2015025240
Military art and science--Decision making.
Strategy.
United States--Military policy.
United States--Military relations--Developing countries.
Developing countries--Military relations--United States.