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Cheap threats : why the United States struggles to coerce weak states / Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Washington, D.C. : Georgetown University Press, 2016Description: xii, 270 pages ; 24 cmContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • unmediated
Carrier type:
  • volume
ISBN:
  • 9781626162822
  • 1626162824
  • 9781626162815
  • 1626162816
Subject(s):
Contents:
Introduction : too cheap to compel -- The logic of costly compellence -- U.S. compellent threats 1945-2007 -- The 1962 Cuban missile crisis -- The 2011 Libya crisis -- The 1991 threat against Iraq -- The 2003 threat against Iraq -- Conclusion : the implications of costly compellence for theory and policy -- Appendix. Description of how the dataset was constructed.
Summary: The United States has a huge advantage in military power over other states, yet it is frequently unable to coerce weak adversary states with threats alone. Instead, over the past two decades, the leaders of Iraq, Haiti, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya have dismissed US threats and invited military clashes. Why have weak states risked and ultimately suffered catastrophic defeat when giving in to US demands earlier might have allowed their survival? Why was it necessary to use force at all? Pfundstein finds that the United States' compellent threats often fail because the use of force has become relatively cheap for the United States in terms of political costs, material costs, and casualties. This comparatively low-cost model of war that relies on deficit spending, air power, high technology, and a light footprint by an all-volunteer force has allowed the United States to casually threaten force and frequently carry out short-term military campaigns. Paradoxically, this frequent use of "cheap" force has made adversary states doubt that the United States is highly motivated to bear high costs over a sustained period if the intervention is not immediately successful.
Holdings
Item type Home library Collection Call number Materials specified Status Date due Barcode Item holds
Adult Book Adult Book Dr. James Carlson Library NonFiction 327.117 P531 Available 33111008149276
Total holds: 0

Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:

Why do weak states resist threats of force from the United States, especially when history shows that this superpower carries out its ultimatums? Cheap Threats upends conventional notions of power politics and challenges assumptions about the use of compellent military threats in international politics.

Drawing on an original dataset of US compellence from 1945 to 2007 and four in-depth case studies?the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 2011 confrontation with Libya, and the 1991 and 2003 showdowns with Iraq?Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain finds that US compellent threats often fail because threatening and using force became comparatively "cheap" for the United States after the Cold War. Becoming the world's only superpower and adopting a new light-footprint model of war, which relied heavily on airpower and now drones, have reduced the political, economic, and human costs that US policymakers face when they go to war. Paradoxically, this lower-cost model of war has cheapened US threats and fails to signal to opponents that the United States is resolved to bear the high costs of a protracted conflict. The result: small states gamble, often unwisely, that the United States will move on to a new target before achieving its goals.

Cheap Threats resets the bar for scholars and planners grappling with questions of state resolve, hegemonic stability, effective coercion, and other issues pertinent in this new era of US warfighting and diplomacy.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 241-260) and index.

Introduction : too cheap to compel -- The logic of costly compellence -- U.S. compellent threats 1945-2007 -- The 1962 Cuban missile crisis -- The 2011 Libya crisis -- The 1991 threat against Iraq -- The 2003 threat against Iraq -- Conclusion : the implications of costly compellence for theory and policy -- Appendix. Description of how the dataset was constructed.

The United States has a huge advantage in military power over other states, yet it is frequently unable to coerce weak adversary states with threats alone. Instead, over the past two decades, the leaders of Iraq, Haiti, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya have dismissed US threats and invited military clashes. Why have weak states risked and ultimately suffered catastrophic defeat when giving in to US demands earlier might have allowed their survival? Why was it necessary to use force at all? Pfundstein finds that the United States' compellent threats often fail because the use of force has become relatively cheap for the United States in terms of political costs, material costs, and casualties. This comparatively low-cost model of war that relies on deficit spending, air power, high technology, and a light footprint by an all-volunteer force has allowed the United States to casually threaten force and frequently carry out short-term military campaigns. Paradoxically, this frequent use of "cheap" force has made adversary states doubt that the United States is highly motivated to bear high costs over a sustained period if the intervention is not immediately successful.

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